By 2026, Gulf engagement in Africa has evolved from commercial investment and development assistance into a multidimensional contest over ports, resources, supply chains, political partnerships and security. The central question is whether African states can turn this competition into structural development, or become arenas in which external powers pursue their own strategic priorities.

1. From economic partnership to geopolitical influence

The expansion of Gulf influence in sub-Saharan Africa reflects a fundamental change in how the Gulf Cooperation Council’s six members, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman, approach the continent. Since 2000, and particularly after the global financial crisis of 2008 and the Arab uprisings of 2011, engagement has expanded beyond aid, trade and agricultural investment to include port management, logistics, energy, strategic minerals, defence cooperation, intelligence relationships and diplomatic mediation.

Specialize studies identify this as a transition from economic diplomacy to the deliberate construction of geopolitical influence. Its central insight is that economic, security and diplomatic instruments increasingly operate together: ports secure commercial corridors; agricultural investments support food-security objectives; defence partnerships strengthen political relationships; and mediation can translate financial or humanitarian engagement into diplomatic access.

This transformation coincides with intensifying competition among China, the United States, Russia, European powers, Turkey, India and regional actors for African markets, minerals and maritime access. Gulf states occupy a distinctive position in this competition. Their sovereign wealth funds, globally active companies, financial resources and ability to conclude commercially focused agreements can provide speed and flexibility. Yet their influence should not be confused with that of a unified Gulf bloc: Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Doha have different priorities and have sometimes pursued competing political objectives.

2. The scale of the financial expansion—and its limitations

The scale of Gulf engagement has grown substantially. The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) reported that Gulf Cooperation Council states channelled nearly $113 billion in foreign direct investment into Africa in 2022–2023, exceeding the approximately $102 billion recorded over the preceding decade. Chatham House has separately reported more than $100 billion in Gulf investment over a decade, including $59.4 billion attributed to the UAE and $25.6 billion to Saudi Arabia. These estimates cover different periods and methodologies and should not be combined into a single cumulative total.

The distinction between announced commitments, signed agreements, actual capital flows and completed projects is crucial. Large headline figures indicate strategic ambition, but they do not necessarily reveal how much money has reached African economies, how many jobs have been created or how much value remains locally.

Experts identify sovereign wealth funds and state-linked investment institutions, including Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, ADQ, Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund and Qatar Investment Authority, as important vehicles for long-term economic positioning. Their significance lies not only in the capital they deploy, but in their ability to establish durable relationships with governments and secure positions in infrastructure and strategic sectors.

The political implication is straightforward: capital becomes a source of influence when access to financing, infrastructure or markets gives an investor sustained leverage over decisions that matter to a host country.

3. Three powers, three approaches

Abu Dhabi has developed the most geographically diversified model of Gulf engagement in Africa, focusing on infrastructure, ports and security. Companies such as DP World and AD Ports Group have pursued port operations, logistics, industrial zones and trade corridors, while Emirati engagement has also expanded into energy, agriculture and security partnerships.

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies estimated the UAE’s East African project and investment portfolio at approximately $47.4 billion. Its estimates included about $21.9 billion in Sudan, $13 billion in South Sudan, $6.6 billion in Uganda and $2.3 billion in Ethiopia. These figures are reported project and investment estimates, not proof that the full amounts have been disbursed; some projects have been disrupted by conflict.

The UAE’s approach is strategically significant because commercial infrastructure can also provide access to maritime corridors, political relationships and security networks. Its position is not adequately explained by the pursuit of financial returns alone. Research by the International Institute for Strategic Studies has examined the growing integration of Emirati economic and security engagement in Africa.

Saudi Arabia focused on resources, food security and economic diversification. Riyadh’s expanding engagement is closely connected to Vision 2030, the diversification of the Saudi economy, access to agricultural production and the acquisition of strategic minerals. Energy, mining, infrastructure and development finance are central to this model. Saudi investment is also linked to the security of the Red Sea, through which vital commercial routes connect the Gulf to the Mediterranean and global markets.

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies estimated Saudi engagement in East Africa at approximately $15.6 billion, including a major concentration in energy and projects in Djibouti. As with the UAE estimates, these figures should be understood as reported commitments and project values rather than audited capital flows.

Qatar, on its part, focuses on mediation, aid and soft power. Doha has relied more heavily on diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, development programmes and mediation, alongside investments in sectors including infrastructure, aviation and services. This approach can generate political access and international standing without requiring the same breadth of port and logistics holdings associated with the UAE.

Qatar’s engagement in African conflict mediation illustrates the potential advantages of this model, but diplomatic visibility should not be mistaken for conflict resolution. The test is whether mediation produces agreements that are implemented, reduce violence and address the interests of affected populations.

These distinctions are relative rather than absolute: all three states combine economic and political tools. Their differences lie in the weight they give to particular instruments, not in a clean separation between commercial and strategic motives.

4. Ports and maritime corridors: where commercial assets become geopolitical leverage

The Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Bab el-Mandeb strait and Indian Ocean form a strategic system linking Gulf economies with the Suez Canal and international markets. Gulf interest extends beyond the Horn of Africa to Atlantic-facing ports and the Gulf of Guinea, reflecting the importance of logistics and supply chains across the continent.

The UAE’s port investments illustrate the wider stakes. In October 2023, DP World signed a 30-year agreement to operate a major part of Tanzania’s Dar es Salaam port. In the Horn, Emirati commercial and political relationships have also involved locations including Berbera and Bosaso. These ports can facilitate trade and investment, but their strategic significance depends on the terms of each agreement, the surrounding political context and any associated security arrangements.

Studies stress that port investments are increasingly connected to transport networks, industrial zones, energy infrastructure and maritime security. This is a critical point: influence does not necessarily arise from owning a port outright. Long-term operating concessions, control of logistics services and access to essential transport nodes can create substantial leverage.

For African governments, the issue is therefore not whether foreign companies should operate ports, but whether agreements preserve public oversight, fair competition, national policy flexibility and the capacity to renegotiate arrangements when circumstances change.

5. Food security, minerals and the risk of extractive partnerships

Food security was a major driver of Gulf investment following the global food-price crisis of 2007–2008. Limited arable land and water resources at home encouraged Gulf companies and investment institutions to pursue agricultural projects in countries including Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Ghana. These investments can bring financing, irrigation, storage and transport infrastructure. But they can also raise concerns over land rights, water use, local food availability and the distribution of economic benefits.

A similar tension is emerging in minerals. Africa’s deposits of gold, copper, lithium, cobalt and manganese are increasingly important to energy systems, advanced manufacturing and the global transition towards lower-carbon technologies. Saudi Arabia has prioritised mineral partnerships as part of its economic diversification, while Emirati companies have pursued energy, logistics and resource-related opportunities.

The strategic logic is mutually intelligible: Gulf states want diversified supplies, and African governments want investment and industrial development. The critical question is whether the relationship extends beyond the export of unprocessed commodities. If mining, agriculture and energy projects do not generate local processing, skilled employment, technology transfer and reliable public revenue, Africa risks remaining a supplier of resources while the higher-value stages of production occur elsewhere.

6. Sudan: a warning about the intersection of money, security and war

Sudan demonstrates why Gulf engagement cannot be assessed through investment figures alone. Its agricultural potential, gold, livestock, mineral resources and Red Sea coastline make it strategically important. Yet the war has transformed commercial relationships and political alliances into issues with consequences for regional security and civilian survival.

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies estimated roughly $24 billion in Gulf and other regional investment interests and assets in Sudan, with nearly $22 billion in non-security commitments attributed to the UAE in its assessment. Many projects have been suspended or disrupted by the conflict. These estimates do not establish that the full sums were invested or that investment commitments caused the war.

More consequentially, the war has exposed competing external relationships with Sudanese armed actors. The UAE has faced allegations of support for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which it denies. Such allegations must be distinguished from confirmed commercial projects and evaluated through credible reporting and investigations. ECFR has examined the relationship between Gulf competition and the Sudan conflict, including the risks that external rivalries complicate efforts to end the war.

The broader lesson is that economic and security engagement can become inseparable when outside powers cultivate relationships with competing political or military actors. External support may alter incentives for belligerents, complicate mediation and prolong conflict. Gulf involvement is not the sole explanation for Sudan’s war, but it belongs in any serious analysis of its international dimensions.

7. The Horn of Africa: investment, access and political sovereignty

The Horn is especially sensitive because the interests of coastal states and landlocked Ethiopia intersect with the strategic priorities of Gulf powers. Ethiopia’s need for reliable maritime access creates opportunities for infrastructure investment and regional connectivity. At the same time, port agreements and transport corridors can affect relations between neighbouring states and the balance of influence along the Red Sea.

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies estimates approximately $2.3 billion in UAE engagement in Ethiopia and identifies a UAE-backed road project connecting Ethiopia with Berbera, valued at around $400 million. Its assessment also states that roughly 90% of Ethiopian trade passes through Djibouti. These figures indicate why alternative routes can have substantial economic and strategic importance, although project valuations should not be confused with verified expenditure.

The risk is not inherent in foreign investment. It emerges when commercial agreements become entangled with contested political status, security arrangements or regional rivalries. African governments must assess not only the immediate financial benefits but also the long-term effects on sovereignty, regional relations and strategic autonomy.

8. Gulf influence in a multipolar Africa

Gulf states are neither substitutes for China and Western powers nor simply junior partners in their strategies. They pursue their own interests while operating in a crowded geopolitical environment. Their advantages include substantial investment capacity, commercially experienced companies, sovereign funds and the ability to negotiate partnerships that may carry fewer formal political conditions than some Western financing arrangements.

But flexibility can cut both ways. Agreements concluded quickly or with limited transparency may leave host governments, communities and public institutions with insufficient oversight. Meanwhile, competition among the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar can create additional options for African states, but it can also expose them to pressure to align with competing external agendas.

The central challenge for African governments is to avoid replacing dependence on one external partner with dependence on another. This requires transparent agreements, public scrutiny, strong regulatory institutions and regional coordination. The African Union’s Agenda 2063 and the African Continental Free Trade Area offer frameworks for connecting external investment to continental priorities, industrial development and regional value chains.

9. Four possible trajectories to 2035

Experts identify four scenarios for the next decade: consolidation of Gulf influence; intensifying international competition; a shift towards sustainable development partnerships; and a relative decline in Gulf influence due to economic or geopolitical shocks.

These scenarios are not mutually exclusive. Gulf influence could expand in ports and minerals while facing stronger competition in energy or development finance. The most desirable outcome for African economies would be a shift from asset acquisition and resource access towards partnerships that deliver local processing, skills, technology, employment and sustainable public revenue. Whether that happens will depend as much on African bargaining power and institutional capacity as on Gulf policy.

Conclusion: who ultimately benefits?

By 2026, Gulf engagement in sub-Saharan Africa has become a significant feature of the continent’s political economy. The UAE has built a particularly broad network linking ports, logistics, investment and security; Saudi Arabia has expanded its focus on energy, strategic minerals, food security and development finance; and Qatar has used mediation, assistance and soft power to strengthen its diplomatic position.

The key analytical point is that capital, infrastructure, security and diplomacy increasingly reinforce one another. This can bring substantial benefits, but it also creates channels through which external actors can influence strategic decisions and, in conflict-affected settings, potentially deepen political fragmentation.

The appropriate response is neither blanket suspicion nor uncritical celebration of Gulf investment. It is a rigorous assessment of each agreement: how much capital is actually delivered, who controls the asset, what value remains in the host country, what obligations are imposed on the state, and whether the project strengthens peace and public welfare.

The ultimate measure of success should not be the size of announced investment or the number of strategic partnerships. It should be whether African societies gain greater productive capacity, economic resilience and political autonomy. If Gulf engagement supports those objectives, it can become a durable partnership. If it mainly secures external access to resources, routes and political influence, it risks reproducing the extractive patterns that have long constrained Africa’s development.

Article’s note: This article incorporates the analytical framework and scenario analysis of Mustafa Boudoumi’s Qiraat African study, alongside research by ECFR, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies and the IISS. Financial figures are attributed to the relevant research and should not be interpreted as independently audited disbursements. Allegations concerning support to armed actors are explicitly attributed and distinguished from established investment data.