The European Commission’s latest push to conclude a trade agreement with Morocco that includes Western Sahara has drawn strong condemnation from Sahrawi advocates, legal experts, and civil society across Europe, Western Sahara Resource Watch indicated in various Articles published on its websites this past week.

Critics say the process repeats what the European Court of Justice (CJEU) has already ruled unlawful: using trade deals to bind Western Sahara without the consent of its people is illegal. The vote on the draft deal is scheduled for 1 October 2025, setting off what many are calling a crisis of credibility for the EU Commission, and a new stage of EU violation of its own laws and Court’s rulings.

A leaked draft of an agreement obtained by Western Sahara Resource Watch (WSRW) reveals that the proposed EU-Morocco trade deal would explicitly cover products originating in occupied Western Sahara, even though in October 4th, 2024 the CJEU annulled the application of the 2019 trade agreement to Western Sahara, one of its judgments centering on the absent consent of the Sahrawi people.

The Court had granted the EU until 4 October 2025 to bring its practices in line with international law, including its own rulings. The EU seems to have instead opted for resuming its violation of the law.

According to WSRW, the negotiation timeline was extremely compressed: EU member states authorized the Commission to negotiate on 10 September 2025, a mandate was given in the early afternoon, and negotiations with Morocco concluded just five days later, on 15 September. Soon after, the Commission adopted proposals for signing and applying the agreement provisionally.

Criticism focuses not only on this speed but on the exclusion of Sahrawi participation: pro-Sahrawi actors argue that the Sahrawi people have been left out of any consultation or negotiation.

Central to the Sahrawi objection is the CJEU’s repeated rulings that Western Sahara is a non-self-governing territory, separate and distinct from Morocco, and that only the Sahrawi people may give consent to agreements affecting their land and resources.

In the joined cases of 4 October 2024 (C-779/21 P and C-799/21 P), the Court reaffirmed those conditions, stating any presumed consent must be accompanied by strict safeguards: No obligations imposed on the people, verifiable benefits proportional to resource exploitation, and sustainable development guarantees.

Under the proposed agreement, products from Western Sahara under Moroccan customs control would again be eligible for EU preferential tariffs. A fact that is in total violation of international law, and is detrimental even to European farmers and business in general.

To meet legal formality, the draft also includes mechanisms for labeling (origin certificates, “region of origin” references), conformity certification of fruit and vegetables via Moroccan authorities, and a joint monitoring mechanism. This would also violate the Court’s ruling that ordered for the right labeling of any products originating from occupied Western Sahara.

The EU would furthermore fund infrastructure (e.g. irrigation, energy, desalination) in the occupied territory and increase humanitarian aid to Sahrawi refugee camps, all elements critics claim benefit Moroccan authorities disproportionately while leaving Sahrawis totally marginalized.

Responses to the deal have ranged from astonishment to fury. Hugh Lovatt of the European Council on Foreign Relations called the proposal “really disappointing,” saying it “re-cycles the core elements of the invalid trade agreement” and shows no convincing legal path to include Western Saharan goods under Morocco’s umbrella while respecting law.

Andrea Maria Pelliconi, an international law lecturer, emphasized that ensuring “benefits for the people of Western Sahara” is not sufficient; what matters is that Sahrawis themselves benefit, distinguished from the population at large, which includes Moroccan settlers.

Others see the provisional application aspect as a bypass of democratic oversight, a way to enact the agreement before thorough parliamentary debate.

From the Sahrawi standpoint, this agreement represents an ongoing pattern of exclusion and colonialist dispossession. The people of Western Sahara have long asserted their right to self-determination under international law. They reject arrangements in which Morocco is treated as though it holds legitimate authority over their territory, especially that those agreements are negotiated without Sahrawi direct involvement and consent.

The proposed benefits, they argue, are designed and allocated in ways that bypass their decision-making, reinforcing the colonial dynamic of control over their resources and emboldening the Moroccan occupation.

The EU Commission’s justification is that it is trying to comply with the Court’s judgment by including provisions for benefits, labeling, sustainability, and oversight.

Yet critics maintain that these measures are insufficient without genuine consent and control by the Sahrawi people, through their legitimate representative, Polisario Front.

Should the agreement proceed, many warn it will violate both EU law and international norms. There is also concern that provisional application, whereby the deal is applied before full legislative ratification, places the European Parliament and democratic process under strain.

The outcome is significant not only for Western Sahara, but for how the EU handles non-self-governing territories more broadly: whether legal rulings, consent, and self-determination are respected or whether arrangements can be manipulated with technicalities, delays, ambiguous wording, or rushed procedures.

For the Sahrawis, this is about more than trade, it is a question of sovereignty, rights to their land, resources, identity, and a future in which their voice matters.

The Council of the European Union is scheduled to vote on the agreement on 1 October 2025, and many expect the provisional application to be in place even before all legislative checks are complete.

Pro-Sahrawi groups, legal experts, and civil society are watching closely, preparing both legal challenges and public campaigns. The treaty’s passage may bring immediate economic effects (tariff flows, export certifications) but also long-term political and legal challenges, potentially damaging the EU’s reputation for upholding human rights and international law, unless Sahrawi consent and benefit are front and center.